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Abstract
SQL injection attacks are a major security issue for database-backed web
applications, yet the most common approaches to prevention require a great
deal of programmer effort and attention. Even one unchecked vulnerability
can lead to the compromise of an entire application and its data. We present
a fully automated system for securing applications against SQL injection
which can be applied at runtime. Our system mutates SQL keywords in
the program's string constants as they are loaded, and instruments the pro-
gram's database accesses so that we can verify that all keywords in the final
query string have been properly mutated, before passing it to the database.
We instrument other method calls within the program to ensure correct pro-
gram operation, despite the fact that its string constants have been mutated.
Additionally, we instrument places where the program generates user-visible
output to ensure that randomized keyword mutations are never revealed to
an attacker.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
SQL injection attacks are a major security issue for database-backed web
applications, yet the most common approaches to prevention require a great
deal of programmer effort and attention. Even one unchecked vulnerability
can lead to the compromise of an entire application and its data. We present
a fully automated system for securing applications against SQL injection
which can be applied at runtime. Our system mutates SQL keywords in
the program's string constants as they are loaded, and instruments the pro-
gram's database accesses so that we can verify that all keywords in the final
query string have been properly mutated, before passing it to the database.
We instrument other method calls within the program to ensure correct pro-
gram operation, despite the fact that its string constants have been mutated.
Additionally, we instrument places where the program generates user-visible
output to ensure that randomized keyword mutations are never revealed to
an attacker.
This paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, we present background
context, describing what an injection attack is and how it works. In Chap-
ter 2, we survey other methods for injection attack detection and prevention.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the goals our system tries to achieve and strat-
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egy we use to achieve them. In Chapter 4, we outline the implementation
of the system. In Chapter 5, we discuss the ways we evaluated the system
for security, correctness, and performance. Finally, in Chapter 6, we review
limitations of the current implementation, explore avenues for further work,
and present a short summary.
1.1 Injection Attacks
Injection attacks are a form of attack in which malicious users of a program
craft input strings in a way that subverts normal program operation. Vulner-
abilities may occur any time a program accepts user input and later uses that
input as part of the source code for an executable program. For example, a
program might prompt the user to enter his name, and subsequently use the
string that the user provided as the name of a file in a shell program. If the
user knows how the shell program is structured, he may be able to provide,
instead of his name, a string that changes the structure of the shell program.
By doing so, he can cause the program to execute arbitrary commands on
his behalf, using its privileges.
1.1.1 Web Applications and SQL
The web, because of its public nature, its popularity, and its programming
model, provides particularly fertile ground for injection attacks. Many web
sites are publicly accessible, and many others that require registration do
not ask for much verification of their users' identities. This makes it easy
for potential attackers to gain access to the application. There are a large
number of web sites with valuable data, which means there are many attrac-
tive targets for attackers. Finally, the fact that many web sites use database
backends to store their data creates the potential for injection attacks.
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Typically, the communication channel from a web program, or applica-
tion, to its database is text-based: the application presents the source code
for a program (known as a query) to the database. The database then com-
piles and executes that program, returning the results to the application. The
application provides the front-end interaction with a user's web browser, re-
ceiving input from the user. For example, the application might present a
form to the user, in which she can enter free text (e.g. "first name", "com-
ments"), select choices from a list ("quantity", "state/province"), or use
some more complicated mechanism ("date"). All of these values are trans-
lated into string data (text) for the browser-to-application communication
path, even if they are numbers (quantity ="35") or structured data (date
= "2012-04-05").
When the application receives a request from a user and needs to store
those values in its database, it constructs a query using those values. Fig-
ure 1.1 shows an example query written in SQL (Structured Query Lan-
guage). SQL is the lingua franca for most databases in use today. In this
query, the values B-, 08634, ps6, and CSCI 100 came from a web form on
which the user, presumably a professor, typed in the grade and the student
ID, and selected the assignment and class from a drop-down. Update queries
usually return either no results or a single result indicating the number of
rows updated.
UPDATE grades
SET grade = 'B-'
WHERE student-id = '08634' AND
class = 'CSCI 100' AND
assignment = 'ps6'
Figure 1.1: Update query
Another page of the same application might show a particular student all
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of his grades for a class. Figure 1.2 shows a query that returns one row for
each graded assignment the student submitted. In this case, the application
doesn't allow the student to enter his student ID; otherwise any student could
look at anyone else's grades. Instead, it looks up his student ID based on his
login account. The value CSCI 100 originates from a drop-down selection.
SELECT student-id, class, assignment, grade
FROM grades
WHERE studentid = '08634' AND
class = 'CSCI 100'
Figure 1,2: Retrieval query
1.1.2 SQL Injections
To see how a injection attack works, we consider a curious student who would
like to know everyone's grades for the class. Instead of using the standard
form with the class drop-down to submit his request, he manually creates a
request with a specially crafted value, such as xx' OR class = 'CSCI 100.
Notice that he has added quotes into the middle of his value. This allows him
to insert non-value text into the query, modifying its structure and meaning.
The full query now looks as in Figure 1.3, and it retrieves all of the grades
for every student in the class, in violation to the original policy that students
can only see their own grades.
SELECT student-id, class, assignment, grade
FROM grades
WHERE student-id = '08634' AND
class = 'xx' OR class = 'CSCI 100'
Figure 1.3: Query with injection attack, revealing grades for all students
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Let us consider another attack, in which a disgruntled student wishes to
change all of her grades to A+. The application does not allow her to access
the grade-setting page with her login, but she knows about the injection vul-
nerability in the grade listing page. She also knows that the semicolon charac-
ter can be used to separate multiple statements in a query. Thus, she can add
a new statement to the query by using the attack string xx' ; UPDATE grades
SET grade = 'A+' WHERE student-id = '09928' AND class = 'CSCI 100.
The full query now looks as in Figure 1.4, and it accomplishes the attacker's
goal, changing all of her grades.
SELECT student-id, class, assignment, grade
FROM grades
WHERE student-id = '08634' AND
class = 'xx'; UPDATE grades
SET grade = 'A+'
WHERE student-id = '09928'
AND class = 'CSCI 100'
Figure 1.4: Query with injection attack, changing a student's grades
1.1.3 Comment Injection
Some injection attacks require the attacker to not only add his own program
structures to the query, but also remove part of the original program. In
certain cases, the attacker can accomplish his goal just by removing part
of the original query. Attackers can accomplish this by inserting comment
markers to delimit the areas he needs to remove. In SQL there are two kinds
of comment markers: the -- delimiter indicates that the rest of the line
is a comment, while /* and */ mark the beginning and end of a multi-line
comment. When the database interprets the query, it ignores the commented
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areas.
Consider a query that checks whether a user has supplied a valid username
and password combination at login time, as in Figure 1.5. If this query
returns a result row, the login was valid. Otherwise, the login was incorrect
and the user should be prompted again. By injecting a comment marker
into the name field, an attacker can log in to this application as any user,
without needing a password. For example, if he provides dwillens' -- for
name, the query will look as in Figure 1.6, and it will return dwillens's user
ID no matter what he provides for password. Notice that even though the
quotes become imbalanced, the comment marker prevents the extra quotes
from breaking the query.
SELECT user-id
FROM users
WHERE name = 'dwillens' AND password = 'abc123'
Figure 1.5: Login query requiring valid name and password combination
SELECT user-id
FROM users
WHERE name = 'dwillens' -- 'AND password = 'anything'
Figure 1.6: Login query with injection attack
1.2 Prevalence and Consequences
The Online Web Application Security project (OWASP) consistently lists
SQL injection on their Top Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risks
report. In the 2010 report, they describe it as common, easy to perform, and
with severe technical consequences including loss of data or system corrup-
tion [6]. Security company Imperva recently spent 9 months monitoring 30
8
web applications, reporting that on average, they observed 71 attempted at-
tacks per hour on each application, up to 1300 per hour when particular
applications were subject to a focused attack. Based on data from Priva-
cyRights.org, Imperva estimate that nearly 300 million data records have
been compromised through SQL injection since 2005 [10].
These compromised data records can range from as simple as a name and
e-mail address, to credit card and social security numbers. An attacker who
gains access to a system thorough SQL injection can often expose or destroy
any or all of data stored on it. Among the most famous successful attacks
based on SQL injection was the breach of Heartland Payment Systems in
2009, resulting in the compromise of 130 million credit card numbers [2].
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Chapter 2
Prior and Related Work
Injection attacks can be prevented. Whenever a program creates a string
that represents executable code, it must check to be sure that the meaning of
the generated code has the same meaning as originally intended. Many ways
exist to perform this check, but most or all of them require some programmer
intervention to be successfully applied. The rest of this section explores
several existing SQL injection-prevention strategies.
2.1 Manual Prevention Techniques
Most web applications deployed today prevent SQL injections through care-
ful programming. The programmers of these applications keep track of the
source of all the data in the program, either in their heads or explicitly in the
program's code. Whenever the program needs to execute a database query,
the programmer working on that section of the code determines the source
each string that makes up part the query text. If there is a possibility that
that string could include user-entered data, the programmer must make sure
that the program neutralizes potential attacks by sanitizing the string.
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2.1.1 Sanitization
For SQL query text, the most common injection vulnerabilities happen when
a program accepts string data from a user, then inserts that string into query
text. Typically, the string data is surrounded by quotes, to make sure that
it is interpreted as data and not as executable code. However, a malicious
string that includes its own quote can effectively cause the rest of its data to
be interpreted as code.
Sanitizing the user-entered string data can eliminate these vulnerabili-
ties. The sanitization process involves examining the string for any bare
quotes and replacing them with escaped quotes, which will cause them to be
interpreted as part of the string data, rather than ending the string.
Even though many common attack examples involve subverting quoted
string data, it is worth remembering that almost all user interaction data orig-
inates from strings. Web forms, for example, transmit almost all of their data
as strings, over HTTP. Even a select box containing only numeric values still
transmits the selected number to the server using its ASCII representation-a
string of digits. Moreover, an attacker can easily create a program that sends
any string data as the value of any field on a web form.
SQL, on the other hand, treats non-string data differently from string
data. Queries which include numbers are not required to include quotes
around the numbers. Thus, before including user-entered "numeric" value
in a query, the server must check that the string represents a valid number;
for example, an integer value should contain only digits. If a program fails
to perform this check, then an attacker can include any code he wants to,
without having to end any quoted string. Sanitization cannot prevent this
kind of attack.
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2.1.2 Database Access Layers
Many programs that access a database use a special layer of software to man-
age the connections, construct and dispatch queries, and process the results.
This layer usually includes facilities for handling the sanitization process de-
scribed in Section 2.1.1. Usually, the way this works is that the program
prepares a query using a library call provided by the data access layer. The
query template passed to this call contains placeholders for parameter data,
instead of actual parameter values. To execute the prepared query, the pro-
gram provides it to a separate library call, along with the actual parameter
values. Since the database access layer knows that the values passed in are
parameters, and should be interpreted only as data, it can automatically
apply a sanitization technique to the string data.
Some access layers also require the programmer to declare the type of
each parameter in a query. This can help to address the issue of numeric
data types. The access layer can automatically apply its own type checking
logic to ensure that the supplied values have the correct type, so that an
attacker cannot supply non-numeric data where a numeric value is expected.
Though access layers provide some automated security, their use still re-
quires careful programming. When the access layer accepts a query template,
it has no way to determine which parts of the template originated from the
program and which parts are user-entered data. For example, imagine that
the program allows a user to specify the name of a database table to use
as part of the query. In this context, the programmer cannot use a query
parameter to specify the name of the table-query parameters are only for
data values. Thus, the user-entered data must be included as part of the
template, and if the programmer does not check that it represents a valid
table name before including it, an attacker can inject any code he wants into
the query.
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2.1.3 Disadvantages of Manual Prevention Techniques
One of the main disadvantages of manual prevention is the amount of care
and attention required on the part of the programmer to mitigate any and
all vulnerabilities. The problem is twofold. Preventing injection attacks
manually requires care and attention, which means it consumes programmer
time, which costs money. Nonetheless, even one unchecked vulnerability can
be enough for an attacker to compromise the functionality of an application,
or even worse, to gain access to the data stored in the application's database.
These kinds of consequences can be disastrous.
2.2 Automated Prevention Techniques
Automated prevention techniques attempt to relieve the programmer of some
of the burden of remembering to check every query for injection attacks before
sending it to the database. This can both reduce the amount of development
time that must be spent on prevention, and serve as a backstop, foiling
attacks in places where little to no effort was spent to secure the program.
In order to automatically prevent injection attacks, a transparent soft-
ware layer must be inserted between the program and database. This layer
intercepts every query the program sends to the database, and examines it
to determine whether or not it contains a potential attack. If an attack is
detected, the prevention layer rejects the query, sending an error back to the
program. Otherwise, it forwards the query on to the database.
Unfortunately, it is not generally possible to determine by examining a
query string alone whether it contains an injection attack or not, because
the attacker's goal is to create a valid query string which the database can
execute without knowing that it performs the wrong operation. The query in
Figure 1.3, for example, is syntactically a valid SQL query; only the semantic
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meaning of the query has been subverted. Since an automated system cannot
guess what the semantic meaning of the query should be, we cannot detect
this injection without some other information. This means that an auto-
mated prevention mechanisms must maintain some extra data (metadata)
about the program's query strings that allows it to detect when user-entered
data changes a query's structure.
2.2.1 Randomization
Many changes to the structure of a query require the attacker to insert new
keywords into the string. SQLRand [3] tries to prevent these changes by de-
tecting when one of a query's keywords did not exist in the original program.
If the keyword did not exist in the original program, it is likely that it was
inserted by the user, and so the query may represent an attack and should
not be executed.
The metadata required by SQLRand is embedded in the query strings
themselves. When a programmer creates a new query template, she must
modify the keywords in the template, appending a random string of digits to
the end of each one. SQLRand provides a tool that applies the modification
to a single query, but the programmer is responsible for making sure it is
applied to each query. In Figure 2.1, we show how the randomized query
template appears in the program's source code.
SELECT123 student-id, class, assignment, grade
FROM123 grades
WHERE123 student-id = '%s' AND123
class = 'Xs'
Figure 2.1: Randomized retrieval query
SQLRand uses a proxy as its transparent software layer. The programmer
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modifies the program so that instead of connecting to the database directly,
it connects to SQLRand's proxy, which implements the database network
protocol. The proxy maintains its own connection to the real database.
When the program sends a query to the proxy, it parses it using a grammar
that expects randomized keywords instead of standard ones. If the proxy can
parse the grammar successfully, then it produces an unrandomized version
and forwards it on to the database. If it cannot parse the query, then it
is possible that it contains an injection attack, so the proxy simply returns
an error to the program without forwarding anything to the database. In
our example, when the curious student uses the attack string xx' OR class
= 'CSCI 100, the parser rejects it because the token OR, without the key
appended to it, doesn't have any meaning.
2.2.2 Parse Tree Matching
Many automated systems make use of the observation that all successful
injections change the structure of the query they attack. SQLGuard [4]
requires programs to build query strings using SQLGuard, a static class they
provide. When a programmer places user input in the query string, she is
required to declare it as such. SQLGuard wraps the user-entered data in
random keys similar to those used by SQLRand; so all of its metadata is also
carried in the string itself. At query execution time, SQLGuard generates
two query strings; one, the real query, simply has all of the random tokens
removed. The other, a reference query, replaces all of the marked user input
with dummy inputs. SQLGuard parses both query strings, and if the parse
tree from the real query does not match the from for the reference query,
SQLGuard determines that an injection has occurred and stops the query
from executing.
CANDID [1] provides a similar verification system; it generates a reference
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query by replacing user-entered data in the query string with dummy data,
then compares parse trees. Instead of requiring the programmer to declare
which data is user-entered, however, CANDID uses a source-to-source trans-
formation to create a parallel data set for strings in the program. Whenever
the program assigns to a string variable, CANDID inserts code to assign to a
shadow variable which will be used in the reference query. If the real variable
is assigned a string constant, then the shadow variable gets the same value.
If the real variable receives a value from user input, then the shadow variable
gets a dummy value. String operations such as concatenations are performed
on both data sets in parallel. At query execution time, CANDID uses the
shadow variable corresponding to the real query string as its reference.
2.2.3 Taint Tracking
In contrast to SQLRand and SQLGuard, which embed their metadata within
the program strings themselves, several approaches track metadata in sepa-
rate but related objects. CSSE [13] uses the idea of "taint," wherein each
string has some related metadata that describes the source of its data. In
CSSE, each string that is instantiated as the result of user input receives
a taint marking that indicates it consists of untrusted data. Strings from
within the program itself receive no marking. As strings are concatenated or
otherwise manipulated, these taint markings are transferred. For example,
a string which resulted from concatenating user input to a string constant
would have a taint marking indicating which part was copied from the in-
put string. At query execution time, CSSE ensures that there are no un-
escaped single quotes in tainted portions of the query string. Nguyen-Tuong,
Guarnieri, et. al. [11] describe a similar system, in which the verification step
consists of tokenizing the string, then checking to make sure that no keyword
or operator tokens result from tainted data. Both systems require the use of
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a modified PHP runtime system.
WASP [8] takes an opposite approach to the previous two systems, which
the authors call positive tainting. WASP applies taint to trusted, instead
of untrusted, data. Trusted data comprises string constants, and strings
derived from sources listed in a special configuration file. At query execution
time, it tokenizes the string, and only accepts the query if all operators and
keywords result from trusted data. This is an inherently more conservative
estimate, which prevents more injections than negative tainting. However,
it also generates a higher false-positive rate, because in situations where a
query results from a source that should be marked as trusted but is not,
the system will improperly reject it. WASP uses a Java implementation
similar to our own. They take advantage of the Java agent library to perform
transformations on compiled code, inserting instructions into the bytecode
that call their own methods, which keep track of taint and check queries on
execution.
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Chapter 3
Architecture
3.1 Goals
The goal for this project is to introduce a fully automated system for detec-
tion and prevention of SQL injection attacks. All of the automated systems
described so far require some manual effort at development time. For ex-
ample, to use SQLRand, a programmer must change all query templates in
a program's source code so that they only contain randomized keywords,
and must change the database connection parameters so that the program
connects to SQLRand's proxy instead of the database.
There are several reasons to desire a more automated solution than those
proposed previously. Some amount of programmer effort must be spent to
make the required modifications to the program. In addition, the modified
source code may be harder to read and understand, which also contributes
to development costs.
Another advantage we gain from fully automating this process is assur-
ance that all code paths leading from user input to the database are checked.
With manual approaches any mistake in the program, such as unsanitized
string data or a missed data type check, leads to a vulnerability.
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Most importantly though, a major disadvantage of any solution that re-
quires source code modification is that the application of the solution requires
access to the source code. If a person or organization wishes to deploy a web
application developed by a third party, they may not be able to modify
query templates or ensure that the program always sanitizes string data be-
fore inserting them into a query. We wanted to design a system that could
automatically secure a program even without access to its source code.
3.2 Strategy
To protect the database from injection attacks, the protection system will
still need to install a transparent access layer between the program and the
database. Likewise, in order to be able to decide whether a query the program
submits contains an injection, it will need to maintain some metadata about
the sources of the program's data.
Our system uses a security model similar to that of SQLRand. It random-
izes keywords in query strings so that it can determine the source of string
data. When the program wishes to execute a query, it tokenizes the query
string to see if there are any unrandomized keywords. If there are none, it
passes the query on to the database; otherwise, it sends an error back to the
program.
Nevertheless, the manner in which our system accomplishes these tasks
is significantly different from that of SQLRand. As in WASP, we use instru-
mentation to automatically apply our changes to a compiled program when
the runtime system loads it, eliminating the need for a programmer to man-
ually change all of the query templates in the program. It also allows us to
secure a program even without access to its source code. This way, compa-
nies can safely deploy third-party code, without having to worry whether it
contains injection vulnerabilities.
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Applying changes to compiled code has other systemic security benefits.
For example, in SQLRand, the only way to change the randomization key is
to edit the source code, rebuild the program, and test it to make sure nothing
has broken. In our system, the key can be changed at will, and could even
be chosen randomly when the system starts.
While automatic randomization has benefits, it also creates complica-
tions. For example, without potentially complicated dataflow analysis, we
cannot tell, when we encounter a string constant in the program, whether it
is part of a query template or not. This means that we are forced to replace
keywords in every string in the program, even if it will never be used as part
of a query. We have to implement extra functionality to ensure that the
program operates correctly when strings with randomized keywords are used
in a non-query context.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
4.1 Instrumentation
The Java agent infrastructure allows the examination and modification of
Java class bytecode at load time. Our system uses a Java agent to change
the value of strings in a class when it is loaded; this is how it modifies
query templates, replacing standard SQL keywords with randomized key-
words. The agent also replaces certain method calls in the class with calls
to methods we have written. These method call replacements allow us to
insert our own code between the program and the Java libraries, which we
do for two reasons. First, it serves as our transparent query verification layer,
where we can decide whether a given query string contains an injection or
not. Second, it allows us to correct program functioning in places where
automated keyword randomization has mutated a string used outside of the
context of a database query.
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4.1.1 Bytecode Manipulation Tool
Since the Java agent infrastructure only provides access to the raw bytecode
of a class file when it is loaded, we use the ASM bytecode manipulation tool
from the OW2 consortium to implement our bytecode modifications. ASM
reads the raw bytecode, and provides a simple interface for iterating over
each instruction in each method in the class file. It also provides an easy
interface for inserting and removing instructions from a method's bytecode.
4.1.2 premain()
The Java agent infrastructure gives us the ability to execute some code before
the target program's main function begins. This allows us to register our
bytecode transformers and specify which classes to transform. In some cases,
our code depends on classes we would like to transform, which means they
are loaded before our transformer is registered. In these cases, we use the
Instrumentation. retransf ormClasses method to ask the infrastructure to
reload these classes, allowing our transformer a chance to modify their code.
4.2 String Mutation
Whenever a Java program uses a string constant, it contains an ldc (load
constant) instruction, which pushes the value of the constant on the stack.
For example, the compiled code for the statement in Figure 4.1 would con-
tain the three instructions in Figure 4.2. Note that the string data are not
contained directly within the instruction. Rather, the instruction contains
an index into a constant table included in the compiled program.
As each class is loaded, our Java agent examines all of the ldc instruc-
tions in the bytecode. When it finds one that loads a string constant, it
mutates the value, replacing any SQL keywords within the string with ran-
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query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ' + name + "' AND
password = ' + password +
Figure 4.1: Program fragment using string constants
ldc #1; //String SELECT * FROM users WHERE name =
ldc #2; //String ' AND password =
ldc #3; //String '
Figure 4.2: Compiled bytecode referencing string constants
domized versions. It adds the mutated string to the class's constant table,
and updates the ldc instruction's operand. The bytecode from Figure 4.2
might be transformed into the bytecode in Figure 4.3.
ldc #7; //String SELECT123 * FROM123 users WHERE123 name =
ldc #8; //String ' AND123 password =
ldc #9; //String '
Figure 4.3: Compiled bytecode with mutated string constants
4.2.1 Keyword Randomization
Our approach to mutation appends a random string of digits to the end
of each keyword. It has the disadvantage that it changes the final length
of the string constant, as well as the positions of data within the string.
For example, in Figure 4.1, string #1 is originally 34 characters long, but
after mutation, in Figure 4.2, string #7 has 43 characters. Additionally, the
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keyword FROM originally extended from positions 9 to 13 in the string, but
after mutation it extends from positions 12 to 19. These changes can cause
challenges in maintaining program correctness, as we will discuss later.
Another approach to mutation would be to replace each keyword with
a same-length string of random characters. This would have the advantage
of maintaining overall string length and data positions, but we chose not to
use this approach because we wanted to be able to make the possibility of
collisions arbitrarily small. For example, imagine the keyword AND. In order
to mutate this keyword, we have to choose a random three-character string of
characters to replace it. Imagine that we chose the replacement string ZMC. If
a legitimate user enters his password, baZMC8tW, then the query verification
layer will produce something like Figure 4.5 to send to the database. Note
that the user's password has been garbled, and as a result he will not be able
to log in.
RDKDBS id EQNL users VIDQD name = 'john' ZMC password =
'baZMC8tW';
Figure 4.4: Randomized query string with password
SELECT id FROM users WHERE name = 'john' AND password =
'baAND8tW';
Figure 4.5: Derandomized query string with garbled password
It might seem that we could reduce the probability of collision by trying to
pick character combinations that are unlikely to occur in a normal program.
Nevertheless, it may be very difficult to pick such strings, as we can see from
the password example. Additionally, to maintain security, we have to change
the replacement keywords regularly; possibly even as often as every day, or
every time the program is loaded. Each time we do so, it becomes more likely
that we will cause a collision.
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Another solution would be to choose the replacement keywords' charac-
ters from a set unlikely to occur in a program's regular operation. Unicode's
large character set facilitates this-we could choose to replace OR with QH .
This may work, but only as long as we don't try to target a system which
happens to try to use these characters. It may be impossible to find a char-
acter range that will never occur in any program. Additionally, we may run
into character set support issues when debugging the system's operation-
examining randomized queries may become more difficult or impossible.
Our randomization solution, on the other hand, always allows us to reduce
the chance of a collision. Clearly, the chances that we will encounter another
string that collides with a randomized keyword go down as the randomized
keyword gets longer. Even if we only use digits as the key character set, we
can always reduce the probability of a collision by making the key longer.
For example, it may be likely that the string 123 will occur in other parts of
a program, but it is much less likely that the string 829357038497025 will
occur elsewhere. By allowing ourselves flexibility on string length, we gain
the ability to make the probability of a collision arbitrarily small, even if we
choose new randomization keys daily.
4.2.2 Keyword Matching and Replacement
Our string mutation implementation is based on regular expressions. Dur-
ing premain(), we construct a regular expression that matches any SQL
keyword, as long as it is a whole word. For example, we match the the
characters OR in "a OR b" but not in "MORK FROM ORK". Our transformer
uses ASM to scan each instruction in each loaded class file. Each time it en-
counters an ldc instruction, it matches it with this regular expression. Any
matches are replaced with the matched text, followed by the randomization
key.
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4.3 Method Call Replacement
Whenever a Java program calls a method on an object, it contains instruc-
tions that load that object and all of the method arguments onto the stack,
followed by an invoke. . . instruction. The opcode of the instruction de-
pends on the type of method to be called. For example, methods speci-
fied in a regular class definition are called using the invokevirtual instruc-
tion, whereas methods specified in an interface definition are called using the
invokeinterf ace instruction. Figure 4.6 shows a typical method call for one
of the JDBC query-execution methods. Figure 4.7 shows the corresponding
bytecode.
s.execute("SELECT * FROM users");
Figure 4.6: Program fragment calling JDBC Statement .execute () method
aload_2 //Statement s
ldc #14; //String SELECT FROM users
invokeinterface #15, 2; //InterfaceMethod
java/sql/Statement . execute: (L java/lang/String; ) Z
Figure 4.7: Bytecode fragment calling JDBC Statement .execute () method
Notice that this code first loads the Statement instance owning the
execute method, followed by the String argument to the method. For
static methods, there is no owning instance to load, so a static method call
simply loads the arguments before executing the invokestatic instruction.
We take advantage of this difference to easily replace method calls in the
compiled code with calls to our own methods. For each method we want
to replace, we define a static method that takes, as its first argument, an
instance of the class whose method we are replacing. The static method's
second argument is the same as the replaced method's first argument, the
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third argument is the same as the replaced method's second, and so on. This
way, when our Java agent encounters an invokeinstance or invokevirtual
instruction referring to one of the methods we wish to replace, it simply re-
places that instruction with an invokestatic referring to our static replace-
ment method.
4.3.1 Instrumentation Annotations
Unlike the string mutation pass, which examines and potentially modifies
every ldc instruction in a target class file, we only want to replace certain
invoke.. . instructions. To make it easier to determine which method calls
to replace, we devised a system of annotations with which we mark our
replacement methods.
When we want to replace calls to methods in a particular class or in-
terface, we create an instrumentation class to contain them. For exam-
ple, to replace methods in java. sql. Statement, we define a new class,
StatementInstrumentation. We apply the @InstrumentationClass anno-
tation to StatementInstrumentation, as shown in Figure 4.8. This annota-
tion requires the name of the class or interface owning the original method. If
the original method owner is an interface, we also set isInterf ace = true,
so that our transformer replaces invokeinterface instructions instead of
invokevirtual instructions.
In StatementInstrumentation, we implement methods designed to re-
place calls to the Statement's methods. These replacement methods are all
static, but for non-static calls to Statement, each replacement method takes
an instance of Statement as its first argument, followed by the normal pa-
rameters for that call. We mark these methods using the
@InstrumentationMethod annotation. Using this annotation, we can spec-
ify everything about the target invoke... instruction we would like to
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modify. This includes the type of invoke ... instruction, the name of the
target method, and its type signature. By default, we assume that it is in-
voked with invokeinterf ace or invokevirtual, depending on the value of
isInterf ace in the
@InstrumentationClass annotation. The default name is the same as the
replacement method's, and the default type signature depends on the invoca-
tion instruction. If we are replacing an invokeinterf ace or invokevirtual
instruction, the parameters are the same as the replacement method's with-
out the first parameter. If we are replacing an invokestatic method, then
the targeted type signature is the same as the replacement method's.
@InstrumentationClass(value = "java/sql/Statement",
isInterface = true)
public class StatementInstrumentation {
@InstrumentationMethod
public static boolean execute(Statement s, String sql)
throws SQLException {
sql = SQLRandomizer. getInstance() . intervene(sql);
return s.execute(sql);
}
Figure 4.8: Part of St atement Instrumentation
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4.3.2 Replacement
During premain (), we create our transformer, and register with it of all
of the defined instrumentation classes. It uses reflection to scan all of the
instrumentation classes' annotations, producing a Map from target method
invocations to the instrumentation invocations that should replace them.
Then, as classes are loaded, the transformer scans their bytecode. When
it finds a method invocation, it checks whether it is a call to a targeted
methods. If it is, then the transformer replaces that invocation instruction
with a call to the instrumentation method.
4.4 Instrumentation Methods
We replace method calls in the target program for two reasons. First, prior
to query execution, we need to insert the logic that determines whether the
provided query text might contain an injection attack. Secondly, in other
places where strings are used, we may need to de-mutate the string data or
otherwise correct the operation of the replaced methods, so that the program
continues to work.
4.4.1 Query Verification
The Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) interface is the API most Java
programs use to interact with a database. Using JDBC, a program es-
tablishes a connection to its database, represented in the program by an
instance of the Connection interface. By calling methods on this object,
the program obtains Statement objects that represent queries it can send
to the database. All of the SQL query text the program sends to the
database passes through these method calls, so they are a natural place
to install the transparent software layer that intercepts queries. To imple-
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ment our query verification layer, we replace calls to Statement. execute()
and Statement .executeUpdate 0, as well as Connection. prepareCall 0
and Connection. prepareStatement 0. Our replacement calls perform the
query verification before calling the original method to send the query to the
database.
Tokenizer
To implement query verification, we initially modified an existing SQL92
parser, written in Java, called JSqlParser. Unfortunately, there are many
different dialects of SQL, because nearly every database management system
(DBMS) has extended the language, usually to support DBMS-specific fea-
tures. The plain SQL92 parser failed to recognize several syntactic structures
from our initial tests.
One possible solution to this problem would be to extend the parser until
it supported each individual SQL dialect completely. We find, though, that
we do not necessarily need a full parser to determine whether a query string
contains a potential injection attack or not. Instead, it is sufficient to tokenize
the string, breaking it up into program elements such as identifiers, keywords,
numbers, strings, and operators. In the example query string in Figure 4.9,
there are eight tokens, including the keyword FROM123, the identifier users,
the string 'Dave', and the operator =.
SELECT123 * FROM123 users WHERE123 name = 'Dave'
Figure 4.9: Example query string containing 8 tokens
One complication with the tokenization approach is that in SQL, not all
keywords are reserved. This means that it may be impossible to tell, without
fully parsing its context, whether a particular token represents a keyword
or an identifier. In order for tokenization to work, we make the simplifying
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assumption that keywords are not used as identifiers; therefore, we apply our
check to any keyword or identifier in the token stream.
Verification
Once the query string is tokenized according to SQL's syntax, we examine
the keywords and identifiers. For each one, we check whether it is an plain
keyword, without the random mutation applied. This would indicate that it
did not come from one of the program's string constants. If we find such a
keyword, we reject the query, reporting a database error to the program.
If the query text contains no unmutated keywords, we remove all instances
of the randomization key from the query. Since we only remove instances of
the key in this step, an attacker cannot break the system by using his own
random key. If he did so, his random key wouldn't be removed, and the
database itself would reject the query as invalid.
4.4.2 Program Correctness
As mentioned earlier, one issue with a fully automated approach is that it can-
not benefit from the careful eye of a programmer when it makes its changes
to the program. When it mutates the program's strings, for example, it
cannot tell whether a particular string is part of a query template or not.
This indiscriminate modification will cause the help text "Select whether
you want guacamole or not" to be changed to "Select123 whether you
want guacamole or123 not123". These modifications can cause user con-
fusion, unexpected behavior, and program crashes. In general, we need a
way to preserve program correctness even when its string data have been
indiscriminately modified.
Fortunately, all operations that modify or examine string data in Java
are implemented in method calls, even the + concatenation operator, which
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compiles as a call to the StringBuilder. append method. This allows us
to use the same method-call replacement technique to insert our own code
whenever we want to correct the outcome of an operation on mutated string
data.
String Comparison
Many of the cases we had to correct involved comparisons. We wanted to
preserve the meaning of string equality, even when strings that occurred
as constants have been mutated whereas strings that came from user in-
put have not. For example, the comparison "ROW". equals (str) should re-
turn true whenever str contains "ROW" or "R0W123". To implement these
semantics, we instrument calls to String.equals, String. hashCode, and
String. compareTo. The instrumented methods pass both values to the same
routine that removes the randomized key when a query verifies as safe, before
calling the original comparison method.
Any classes on which our code depends do not get transformed automat-
ically. In some cases we are able to retransform these classes so that any
time they call one of the string comparison methods, our code is invoked in-
stead. In other cases, we were unable to retransform the dependencies. For
example, HashMap is loaded and used extensively before our transformer can
start. In this case, we replace calls to HashMap's methods with calls to our
own methods, so that we can undo the mutations before entering HashMap's
logic. Other types of Map and Set are able to use our implementations of
String. hashCode and String. equals to produce correct results.
Because Java Strings are immutable, the string library is able to pro-
vide a faster way to test for string equality. By calling the String. intern
method, a program can obtain a reference to a canonical ("interned") repre-
sentation of the string. This reference can then be compared to other interned
strings, and if these references are equal then the strings must be equal. This
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can provide a performance increase over standard string comparison, which
must iterate over every character in the strings if they are indeed equal.
Testing references for equality does not call a method, so we cannot apply
our method call replacement strategy in this case. Instead, we observe that
the primary use of interned strings is for comparison. Also, there are no
performance benefits to interning a string constant that is part of a query
template, i.e. interning does not provide any benefits for concatenation or
value interpolation. These reasons make it unlikely that an interned string
d - '1 ( (
constant will ever be used in a query context (user-entered strings may be
interned and used, but these are not randomized anyway). So, in this case,
instead of replacing the reference equality instruction, we instead replace
calls to String. intern, inserting our own code which removes the random
key before calling the real intern method.
String Length and Positions
Other string operations may also be affected by our mutations. Because we
have elected to append our key to each keyword in the statement, rather
than picking same-length replacements, our randomization pass will change
both the overall length of string constants and the positions of characters
within them. Consider the string in Figure 4.10, which becomes the string
in Figure 4.11. when mutated. The original string has length 19, while
the mutated string contains 25 characters. The * symbol has moved from
(zero-indexed) position 7 to position 10. The keyword FROM, which origi-
nally extended from positions 9 to 12, now reads FROM123 and extends from
positions 12 to 18. All of these changes affect the correctness of string op-
erations such as String.length, String.charAt, String.substring, and
String. indexOf, as well ass the correctness of operations that build on these
primitives, like regular expression matching and string splitting.
Because these changes affect methods that return string positions as well
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S E L E C T * F R 0 M u s e r s
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 4.10: Original String, with character positions shown below
S E L E C T 1 2 3 *F R 0 M 1 2 3 u s e r s
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4
Figure 4.11: Mutated string
as those that use them as parameters, it is not an unreasonable assumption
that many programs will remain correct. For example, a program that uses
indexOf to find the spaces in our mutated example string will correctly
find them at positions 9, 11, and 19. If it subsequently uses substring to
extract the text between these positions, it will correctly obtain the strings
SELECT123, *, FROM123, and users. The randomized keywords obtained may
be derandomized when they are used in some other context later. Only if
the program tries to find and operate on characters in the random key will it
become incorrect. Note also that only string constants are randomized. All
of the string-indexing operations continue to operate the same way on strings
obtained as input. Many programs do not attempt to use indexing operations
on their own string constants, or even on strings built by concatenating them
with input. So, it may be possible to simply ignore the string length and
position changes, and expect that many programs will still be able to operate
properly. We pursued this course, after finding that all of our test programs
fell into this category.
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Nevertheless, it may be desirable to maintain the consistency of these
operations for programs as much as possible. For example, mutation might
make a program's regular expressions match incorrectly-the expression
([A-Za-z] + [A-Za-z] +), which matches two sequences of letters separated
by a space, will no longer match the string "FROM users", because it has
been mutated to FROM123 users. In addition, programs which supply string
positions as constants will no longer work properly. For example, a program
which expects to retrieve "FROM users" by calling substring(9, 18) will
instead receive " * FROM12". (Note that the arguments to substring are
the beginning index and the ending index, and that the ending index is not
inclusive.)
We implemented a solution to correct these issues, making indexOf,
charAt, length, and substring consistent with respect to unmutated po-
sitions. All four receive and return position values as if they were indexed
into the original string. To implement indexOf, charAt, and length, it is
sufficient to demutate the string before passing it to the real API method.
substring requires some extra work.
For substring, we would like to preserve the randomization of a keyword
if and only if it is fully contained within the requested substring. For example,
substring(7, 15) should return "* FROM123 u", whereas substring(7,
11) should only return "* FR", and substring(11, 15) should only return
"OM u".
The first step is to build a table describing where the keywords exist in
both the unmutated and mutated string. In our example string, this looks as
in Figure 4.12. We build this table using the same regular expression we use
when derandomizing strings. Each time it matches a randomized keyword,
we add its position in the mutated string to the table. The offsets in the
original string can be calculated by subtracting the number of randomized
keywords we have seen so far, times the length of the random key string
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(3 in this example). Keyword extents can never overlap, because only one
keyword precedes each instance of the key.
Keyword randomization table:
Keyword Original Start Original End Mutated Start Mutated End
SELECT 0 6 0 9
FROM 9 13 12 19
Figure 4.12: Randomization Table
Once we have the table, we use it to adjust the beginning and ending
index of the substring we are to retrieve. The substring's beginning position
in the mutated string must be offset by the same amount as the end of the
closest preceding keyword. So, we find the keyword with greatest "origi-
nal end" position smaller than the substring beginning position, and adjust
the substring beginning position by the difference between that keyword's
"original end" and "mutated end" positions.
The end position shifts similarly. However, if the beginning of the sub-
string falls in the middle of a keyword, the logic is not quite the same. In this
case, if the substring end position coincides with that keyword's end position
then we shift by the amount for the preceding keyword (as we would if the
position were in the middle of this keyword). This prevents us from including
the random key when a substring does not pick up the whole keyword. If
the substring continues past the end of the keyword, we have to break the
substring operation up into two operations, one ending at the end of the
keyword, and the other beginning there. We then concatenate their results
to produce the correct substring.
substring(7, 15) does not begin in the middle of a keyword, so it does
not have to be broken into two operations. To adjust the beginning position,
we find that SELECT is the closest preceding keyword. SELECT's end position
shifts by 3 positions, so the beginning position in the mutated string starts
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at 10. The end position does not coincide with the end of a keyword, so we
shift it by 6, the same amount as the end position of FROM; producing the
ending position 21. If we examine Figure 4.11, remembering that substring
is not inclusive of the end position, we can see that the characters from 10
to 20 represent the substring we wanted to generate, "* FROM123 u".
substring(7, 11) proceeds similarly. The beginning position 7 shifts
to 10 as before, but the closest preceding keyword for ending position 11 is
SELECT, so we shift 11 by 3, to 14. The characters from 10 to 13 in the
mutated string are, again, the correct substring, "* FR".
substring (11, 15) does have to be broken into two operations, because
its beginning position is in the middle of the keyword FROM (which extends
from positions 9 to 13), and its end position is after the end of the keyword.
The first sub-operation substring(11, 13) begins in the middle of FROM
and ends at its end, so the end positions shifts according to SELECT, by 3
to 16. The beginning position also shifts by 3, to 14. Characters 14 and 15
of the mutated string produce the string "OM". The second sub-operation
substring(13, 15) shifts both positions by 6 using the offset from FROM.
Positions 19 and 20 of the mutated string produce " u", so the final result
is "OM u", as expected.
One consequence of making the operations consistent in this way is that
random keys may be lost in certain cases. For example, consider a program
that copies from a string to a character array by looping through it, character
by character. Each time it calls charAt, it retrieves a single character from
the derandomized string; at the end, the character array contains only the
derandomized string. Loss of random keys may lead to false positives-
our system would detect an injection where none existed. Additionally, the
instrumentations we have described add a lot of overhead to string operations.
Because of this, and because we suspect that many programs will operate
properly even if string operations are inconsistent with constant positions,
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we decided not to use this model of string consistency in our final system.
4.4.3 Output Envelope
Besides affecting program correctness, improper handling of the mutated
strings can pose a security risk. If a keyword has been properly mutated,
then at query verification we assume it is safe, because it must have or-ginated
in one of the program's string constants. However, if the attacker car figure
out how to mutate his own keywords cgretly, . can make -r
to also be safe. If the program outputs "Selectl23 whether you want
guacamole or123 not123" to an attacker's display, then he has learned how
to mutate the keywords SELECT and OR, and can then use them as part of
future injection attacks.
We should note that this may be one major advantage our approach
has over static source code randomization techniques. A standard practice
during application development is to print out the text of a failing query to
the user's terminal, so that the programmer can see what part of the query is
producing a problem. If this debugging output is left in place in production
code, or if an attacker can gain access to a development deployment of the
code, then all he has to do is create an input that produces an error to
reveal all of the randomized keywords in a particular query. With output
derandomization, this is not a concern, because random keys will be filtered
out of even debugging output.
By examining the Java API, we can identify method calls that can carry
string data back to a user. For example, PrintWriter. print (String) is
usually used to display output to a user. The constructor File(String)
is used to create a reference to a file; a user may be able to access the file
system and see the names of created files. It is unlikely that string data that
passes through the output envelope will ever be used as query text.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
5.1 Security
We evaluate our system along three dimensions: security, program correct-
ness, and performance. Security was evaluated as part of IARPA's STONE-
SOUP (Securely Taking On New Executable Software of Uncertain Prove-
nance) program [9]. The goal of STONESOUP is to find a way that the
US intelligence community can deploy software developed by third parties
without having to worry about its security infrastructure. As part of this
evaluation, we were provided insecure test programs to which we applied
our system. The evaluation team then ran a battery of inputs against each
program. For each attack input, our system was evaluated on whether it
was able to render the program unexploitable; that is, that it prevented the
expected undesired behavior. For benign inputs, it was evaluated on whether
it preserved the correct operation of the program.
In the STONESOUP evaluation, there were 17 separate test programs
we were to secure against SQL injections. Across all of the programs, we
received 28 benign test inputs, and 27 attack inputs. For all of the benign
inputs, our system preserved the correct operation of the test program, that
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is, we did not cause the program to break or report an injection incorrectly.
For 24 of the 27 attack inputs, we successfully detected and stopped the
attack. At the time of the evaluation, we had not yet implemented comment
randomization; the three attack inputs we failed to detect involved comment
injection.
We also tested our system against the SAMATE (Software Assurance
Metrics and Tool Evaluation) Reference Dataset Juliet test suite [12], which
contains a number of test programs designed to contain SQL injection vul-
nerabilities; these are primarily listed under "CWE-089: Failure to Sani-
tize Data within SQL Queries (SQL injection)." These programs are all
fairly simple, but they are designed to test a wide variety of query execution
methods (different ways of calling JDBC such as execute, executeBatchO,
executeQuery(), and executeUpdate()) and untrusted data sources (such
as reading from a network socket, file, or environment variable). Against
2024 of the test programs in this suite, we tried 12 generic attack inputs and
7 benign test inputs. We were able to detect all of the attacks, and generated
no false positives.
5.2 Program Correctness
For program correctness, we tried to use real-world programs so that we
could gauge the likely impact on an actual deployment. One program we
tested was Daikon [7], a dynamic invariant detector developed by our group
for a previous project. Daikon reads traces of a program execution and uses
the data to try to find invariant conditions at various program points. The
trace files can be large since they contain a full trace of the execution of a
particular program, including all of the data values within the program at
each point. Once Daikon has read all of the data, it does a large amount of
string processing, including comparisons, concatenation, substring, etc. In
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fact, our initial tests with Daikon were the impetus for our implementation
of interning for comparisons. After applying our system to Daikon, we were
able to verify that it produces the same output as it does without our system.
Since the primary target for our system is web applications, we also tested
it against the open source web application server Tomcat [5]. To test it, we
implemented a small servlet which executes a few simple SQL queries. We
confirmed that the servlet still worked properly with benign inputs while our
system was operational. We also confirmed that attempted injections were
caught and reported as errors.
5.3 Performance
To test performance, we first wrote a small driver program which reads some
input from the console and uses each line to construct a query, which it
executes on a sample database. Without our system enabled, the program's
startup time (before it began reading inputs) was 0.5 seconds, and it took
30.1 seconds to complete after that point. With our system enabled, the
startup time is 2.9 seconds, and the program takes 31.9 seconds to complete
after startup. So, for this simple program, most of the overhead of our system
is in the startup time. During startup, our premain() is running, and all of
the classes that are needed to run our system and the program are loaded
and transformed. This is likely because the number of classes is large-over
200 classes even for a small program. Fortunately, our target programs are
generally larger, longer running processes such as servers, which only pay
their startup cost before serving hundreds or thousands of requests.
To get a sense of what performance is like on larger, string-processing
heavy program, we also timed Daikon. Here we found a more significant
increase in runtime, from 4.1 seconds to 18.5 seconds. This heavy increase in
running time is likely due to the high number of string manipulations used in
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Daikon-each time an operation needs to derandomize a string, that repre-
sents a regular expression match and replacement. However, we expect that
most of our targeted programs will represent a much lower string processing
workload than Daikon, so this is likely to be a high upper bound on the
performance penalty.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Limitations
Our system secures applications against any injection attack that requires
the attacker to add a keyword or comment marker to the query string. A
classification of injection attack types given in [14] shows that this kind of
approach (similar to SQLRand) neutralizes all of the types of attacks that
can do damage or reveal data from an application. Some of the injection
attacks it cannot prevent include illegal queries, alternate encodings, and
stored procedures.
In illegal query injections, the attacker gains information by inducing an
error in the query text. Since we do not actually parse the query before
sending it to the database, an attacker could cause a syntax error by adding
some non-keyword in an illegal place. It is not clear, though, whether he
could induce any other kind of error, such as a type-checking or logical error,
without introducing a new keyword into the query. In alternate encoding
injections, the attacker uses a different way of representing characters to
implement the attack; we cannot detect this in our current implementation,
because to do so we would have to implement these other character sets.
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Stored procedure injections are nearly impossible to prevent in an automated
manner, because at the application level there is no way to know what the
stored procedure will do with the data we pass to it; it may change data,
retrieve it, or do something completely different such as run an operating
system command.
Another limitation to our system relates to correctness and consistency of
string operations. We described two strategies for dealing with string opera-
tions. In one we allow string operations to proceed unchanged on potentially
mutated strings, which may cause incorrect program functioning in certain
cases. In the other we are careful to maintain the exact semantics of string
operations, at the expense of performance and of incurring false positives,
wherein legitimate query strings are rejected because of the processing that
occurred along the code path that generated them. Both of these solutions
represent some amount of compromise, but we think that many programs
will be able to operate under the first, more relaxed, model.
6.2 Further Work
The output envelope of the system is not yet fully instrumented. To do so
we need to make an inventory of all the methods in the JDK, and decide for
each one whether it represents a potential output from the system, adding
an instrumentation method for it if so.
Currently, the random key is chosen in the system source code, to ease
debugging. For a real deployment, there needs to be a way to change the key
on a regular basis, at system startup for example.
Checking for keywords by tokenization works well, but the system could
be more robust if it employed a full parser. For example, it could distinguish
between identifiers and keywords, alleviating the issue of collisions. The
problem we found with this approach is that there are a wide variety of SQL
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dialects in use, so it is easier to maintain a common list of keywords than a
common grammar for all of them, or one for each.
String operation performance and consistency are certainly weak points,
and it is possible that further work in this area might lead to a better model
that would make fewer restrictions on the string operations the secured pro-
gram could employ, or offer better performance and false-positive behavior
than the strictest model.
6.3 Summary
We have introduced a new system for securing application programs against
SQL injection attacks. This is particularly important for web applications,
which by their nature are easy targets and prone to include vulnerabilities.
Our system mutates, at load time, the string constants of the program to
be secured, changing any SQL keywords it finds by appending a random
key. These random keys will be propagated through the program as string
constants are combined with other data to form full query strings. At the
same time as we mutate the string constants, we replace method calls to SQL
query execution methods so that we can insert calls to our own verification
layer. The verification layer tokenizes the query string, and if it finds any
unrandomized keywords, it assumes they came from user input and rejects
the query. Otherwise, it derandomizes the query and passes it on to the
database.
Our approach has several advantages. It can be applied to compiled
programs without access to their source code, so that institutions can de-
ploy third-party code without worrying about its provenance. It prevents
any injection attack that involves adding a keyword or comment marker to
the query string, which defeats all injection types that directly harm the
database. Finally and most importantly, it is fully automated, so it requires
45
no intervention by an application developer to make it work. This means
that it costs less to implement, and provides more complete security than
the manual solutions which are still commonly used in web development.
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